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Abstract
In this paper we briefly address two issues related to the living conditions of 
youth in Greece and the way these conditions have changed during the 2010s. 
The first is about the educational trajectories of young Greeks which are lead-
ing to less promising prospects in the labour market and become increasingly 
unequal and socially selective during the crisis. The second issue is the political 
response of young Greeks to the crisis. There is evidence that they have been 
actively mobilized against austerity measures and, at the same time, they have 
increased their participation in the political system, both in confrontational and 
institutional politics. Inequalities are increasing and social mobility prospects 
for the young people are deteriorating. Their political response, however, is an 
outcome depending on many other factors with the politics of parties attractive 
to youngsters’ aspirations during the crisis being among the most important.
Keywords: economic crisis; education; inequalities; political behaviour; youth.
1.	 Introduction
Greece has witnessed a severe economic crisis for almost 10 years, 
unprecedented in times of peace. During this period, more than 25% 
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2012	and	2015	(ELSTAT	2019,	40-41) and much higher (almost 60%) 
for very young people (15-24	 years	 old)	 (ELSTAT	2019,	 34-35). The 
outflow of young people seeking jobs in foreign labour markets was 
growing –	as	was	the	case	in	other	Southern	European	countries	as	well.	
The difference with previous waves of emigration is that in the 2010s 
the most qualified part of younger generations was affected (Fig. 1), 
with the less qualified – who fare worse in the labour market – being left 
behind, since they cannot find opportunities abroad.
Figure 1. – Balance of Inflow/Outflow of professionals 
in/from selected European countries 1.
The policies of strict austerity that have been followed up to 2018 have 
not redressed this dire situation but, on the contrary, prolonged it and 
made it worse. When the crisis started to retreat, the question was 
whether the government of the Left would be able to implement effec-
tive anti-crisis policies – aiming at the same time at boosting economic 
development and at socially distributing charges in more equitable 
ways – or if it would be replaced by traditional parties to pursue policies 
 1 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-05/greece-is-hemorrhaging-
its-most-talented-workers.
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favoured by the dominant European and local political and economic 
elites. Eventually, the political change after the elections of July 2019 
followed the second scenario.
The task for the government of the Left was certainly not easy. For 
instance, in order to deploy successful policies based on research and 
innovation, it had to rely on EU structural funds which could only be 
used if conditionalities related to the European Research & Innovation 
Smart	Specialisation	Strategy	(RIS3)	were	fulfilled 2. This strategy seeks 
to boost European competitiveness by promoting competition among 
European regions for funds accorded to plans of regional specialisation 
that should increase their strong assets and their competitive edge. 
The map of innovation leaders and slow-moving regions (Fig. 2) shows 
that this investment strategy mainly favours countries of Western and 
Northern Europe with regions that already have a competitive edge. In 
particular, in terms of employment this strategy was expected to foster 
brain circulation - which is, in principle, a positive process. However, 
brain circulation is something that does not characterise regions in crisis 
or regions lagging in research and innovation, where brain circulation 
will	probably	end	up	meaning	further	brain	drain.	Such	issues	continue	
to represent a real and difficult challenge for every government in the 
slow-moving regions and in particular for governments of the Left.
In this paper we focus on two issues related to conditions, prospects 
and reactions of the younger generation during the crisis period. The 
first is related to social inequalities in education and to their aggravation 
in recent years as expressed by the increase of social exclusiveness in the 
access to higher education. Education is the mechanism that – among 
other things – gives young people the qualifications required by techno-
logical innovation to cope with the growing expectations of labour mar-
kets. However, educational systems do not provide these qualifications 
in a random way and, under the recent crisis in Greece, it seems that 
qualifications – and especially those more significant, provided by elite 
institutions – are reinforcing rather than countering social privilege.
The second is the mapping of changes in the younger generation’s 
political attitudes and behaviour, as shown through their “return to 
politics” and the radicalisation of their voting. An important side-effect 
of the crisis has been indeed a noteworthy change in the younger gen-
eration’s relation to politics, progressively marked since the late 1980s by 
 2 http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/s3pguide.
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a severe decline in party alignment, ideological identification with the 
Left and a noteworthy distance from mainstream political participation.
Figure 2. – European Regions in terms of innovation capacity 3.
 3 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/innovation/regional_en.
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2.	 Education	and	inequality	during	the	crisis
The question whether social inequality is perceived as an issue of social 
justice depends on the power and firmness of class hegemony. When 
the dominated accept their socially subordinate position, they usually 
perceive this arrangement as the natural order of things or, if not as 
socially just, at least as fair.
The liberal and neoliberal ideas, which have become dominant 
during the last four decades, do not consider social inequality as a 
problem (except ‘modern liberalism’ that is more sensitive to this issue) 
(Ryan 2012). Considering individuals as inherently unequal, the unequal 
conditions under which they end up living appear as a normal outcome. 
Accepting inequality as a normal situation is compatible with the view 
that social progress results from individual progress and that the latter 
is the product of competition among free individuals. This subsequently 
leads to the belief that common interest is best served by society’s sup-
port to the strongest players (students, businesspersons, athletes …), 
whose individual progress is supposed to have a trickle-down effect to 
the benefit of society as a whole.
Policies inspired by such ideas and followed in most parts of the 
world during the last decades led to the spectacular growth of inequali-
ties. This brought inequalities back to center stage as an issue of social 
justice, but also as an element that prevents economic growth. Fol-
lowing the analysis of inequality trends in the longue durée by Picketty 
(2013) we realise that we are on a rising slope that leads back to high 
levels of inequality without precedent since the Belle Époque. The new 
rise of inequalities since the 1970s-1980s is, however, much more related 
to income from salaries than from patrimony/fortune, even though the 
latter’s importance has also increased in recent years. Education and the 
way educational systems and mechanisms socially spread – or put barri-
ers to the social diffusion of – aptitudes and specialisation required by 
an increasingly technologically demanding labour market become crucial 
for the reproduction of social inequalities.
Income inequality has grown in Greece during the crisis. Between 
2010 and 2013 the index 80/20 4 (i.e. the ratio of the income of those 
in the higher 20% of the income scale in respect to that of the lowest 
 4 http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/PAGEthemes?p_param=A0802&r_
param=SFA10&y_param=2013_00&mytabs=0.
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20%) increased from 5,6 to 6,6 times and the Gini index of unequal 
distribution increased from 32,9 to 34,4.
The trend of inequalities in education is much less visible. The 
issues present on the social and political agenda are mainly related to 
sensitivities of middle-class households who remain hopeful that a 
proper educational trajectory will enable their children to, at least, 
retain their parents’ social position. The most visible problem is related 
to the difficulties of higher education degree holders – even those hold-
ing	degrees	 from	 the	most	 valued	 and	 exclusive	Schools	 and	Depart-
ments – in finding jobs in a run-down	labour	market.	So,	the	brain	drain	
problem is placed very high on the agenda not only due to its undeniable 
role for undermining potential growth, but also due to the social profile 
of those who are mainly affected by this trend. When lower social strata 
started losing precipitously, in the early 1990s, the access that higher 
education provided them to (mainly public) employment the problem 
received little attention in the social and political debate, although it 
was an important step in the decline of the anaemic and delayed welfare 
state.
The little resonance of the growing social inequality in accessing 
higher education leads today to preventing it from becoming part the 
list of urgent problems. To some extent, the visibility of educational 
inequality in Greece is context-related; educational itineraries have been 
socially differentiated rather late in comparison to other countries – like 
Germany – where they are enforced at a very early stage. The outcome, 
however, in terms of selectivity in the social reproduction process is not 
different from that of more overtly socially selective educational systems 
(Maloutas and Ramos Lobato 2015).
In Greece, the flagrantly privileged educational trajectories refer to 
a rather small percentage of students in elite private schools and in a 
few selected prominent public schools and, further, to the even smaller 
number of those pursuing studies in the internationally renowned uni-
versities of a small group of countries. On the opposite side, the most 
disadvantaged trajectories are either interrupted very early (school drop-
outs) or are extremely ineffective and lead to functional illiteracy; their 
specific weight is also quite small and usually concerns socially excluded 
groups, like the Roma.
The large majority of secondary school students (about 90%) 
attends ordinary public schools in the first three years of the second-
ary (Gymnasio). Most of them (70%) follow the general lyceum option 
in the second part of the secondary (Geniko Lykeio), which gives 
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“direct” access to higher education. This access is mainly determined 
by the performance of candidates in a common entrance examination. 
Performance determines whether a candidate is accepted to his/her first, 
second	or	additional	choice	of	university	School/Department	or	 if	he/
she will be rejected. The participation to a common examination all over 
the country creates the impression of a process offering equal chances 
to the large majority of candidates, if one does not take into account the 
socially unequal resources available for getting prepared for the exami-
nation through collective or private courses that have formed a small 
industry	over	the	years	(Sianou-Kyrgiou	2008).	Social	inequalities	in	the	
access to higher education are of course deep-rooted and related to more 
fundamental structures and processes; the unequal resources for prepa-
ration during the last two or three years before the entrance examina-
tions are just one of their most obvious manifestations.
For several decades, the crucial process in educational trajectories in 
Greece has been the transition between secondary and higher education. 
This transition is regulated by a panhellenic examination established in 
the 1960s where every secondary school graduate can be a candidate. 
Although many governments have subsequently changed the content 
or the way these examinations are performed, it has never been on 
the agenda to radically modify or abolish them (Maloutas 2020). The 
panhellenic examination is a well-respected institution, central in trans-
forming and legitimating a process of social selection into one of indi-
vidual competition where everyone is compensated according to invested 
personal effort and merit.
If equal chances for different social groups in the access to higher 
education really existed, the social profile of students’ parents in all 
university	 Schools	 and	Departments	 should	 not	 be	 very	 dissimilar	 to	
the social profile of the same broad age group (40 to 75) in the general 
population. However, this is not happening. On the contrary, using 
the data concerning the education level and the occupational category 
of students’ parents in all university Departments published by the 
Hellenic	Statistical	Authority	(ELSTAT) 5, we can easily conclude that 
social origin is playing a very important role in accessing higher educa-
tion, and that this role has become even more relevant during the crisis.
Figure 3 shows that candidates with parents having completed 
higher education are twice as likely to study at some university com-
 5 http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/PAGEthemes?p_param=A1403&r_
param=SED34&y_param=2010_00&mytabs=0.
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pared to the average candidate, and that their chances have increased 
from 1,9 to 2,3 times from 2010 to 2013 6. The gap between these privi-
leged candidates and the average candidate is considerably larger when 
the	issue	is	access	to	the	country’s	elite	Schools	and	Departments:	in	this	
case, the privileged candidates in terms of family educational capital had, 
in 2010, 3,1 times the chances of the average candidate to be admitted 
in	elite	Schools	and	Departments	and	this	rate	increased	to	3,6	times	in	
2013 (Fig. 4). Inequality becomes huge when we compare the chances 
of these privileged candidates with those from disadvantaged families 
in terms of educational capital (i.e. with parents having completed the 
9-year compulsory education at the most): 5 times higher, in 2010, to 
be	admitted	to	any	university	School	or	Department	which	increased	to	
7,6 times	in	2013;	and	17,7	times	higher	for	admission	to	elite	Schools	
and Departments, in 2010, which increased to 28 times in 2013.
Education is not simply a training process for younger generations. 
It also differentiates their members according to their performance and 
creates hierarchies that become important for their prospective social 
mobility. These hierarchies reproduce, to a large extent, the class hier-
archies and discriminations in previous generations following the social 
reproduction thesis.
Figure 3. – Candidates’ chances to access higher education 
by the education level of their parents (average candidate’s chances = 100).
 6 Unfortunately,	data	after	2014	are	not	yet	available	to	control	this	trend	in	the	
second part of the 2010s: https://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/-/publication/SED34/	
[09/03/2021]. 
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Figure 4. – Candidates’ chances to access an elite higher education School/Department 
by the education level of their parents (average candidate’s chances = 100) 7.
An important task of schools in so-called meritocratic societies is to 
narrow the gaps by reducing the importance of social origin for educa-
tional performance; this role, however, has been increasingly marginal-
ised	by	neoliberal	ideas	and	policies.	The	US	have	witnessed	in	the	last	
30 years a stability in the production of university graduates which is 
held responsible for the increase of inequality in salary incomes (Goldin 
and Katz 2010; Piketty, 2013). In Greece, the number of graduates has 
stabilised since the early 2000s and the access to higher education has 
become increasingly unequal during the crisis and the austerity policies 
followed ever since.
The crisis has exacerbated inequalities in education, but education 
policies had already paved the way. In the beginning of the 2000s, a 
minimum performance in the panhellenic examination was introduced 
 7 We	considered	indicatively	20	University	Departments	(out	of	a	total	of	262)	as	
‘elite’	Schools,	where	the	education	level	of	students’	parents	was	the	highest	in	2013	
(the changes were insignificant when we used the 2010 data). These Departments have 
also, as a rule, the highest requirements for performance in the admission examinations. 
They	 are	 the	 following:	University	of	Athens	 (Law,	Medicine,	Dental	School,	Phar-
maceutical); Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (Architecture, Medicine, Veterinary, 
Dental	School,	Pharmaceutical,	Civil	Engineering);	University	of	Thessaly	 (Architec-
ture); Democritus University of Thrace (Medicine); University of Ioannina (Medicine); 
University of Crete (Medicine); University of Patras (Medicine, Pharmaceutical, Archi-
tecture, Electrical/Mechanical Computer Engineering); National Technical University 
of Athens (Mechanical Engineering, Electrical/Mechanical Computer Engineering, 
Shipbuilding	Engineering).
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as a prerequisite for admission to any field of studies of higher educa-
tion. This contradicted the nature of the exams which were supposed 
to assign the available positions in higher education to candidates who 
performed better than others. All candidates were a priori eligible for 
higher education having successfully completed secondary education. 
The minimum required performance in the examination abolished the 
a priori eligibility of candidates and, eventually, reduced the number of 
students admitted. This measure disproportionally reduced candidates 
from lower social strata and particularly affected higher vocational edu-
cation.	Some	years	later	this	measure	was	eliminated	and	admissions	to	
universities regained their previous level, but higher vocational educa-
tion never recovered. The new conservative government reintroduced 
the same measure in February 2021 and it is expected that the number 
of students in higher education will be reduced by 23% (Angelopoulos 
et al. 2021). The expected reduction will be again particularly detrimen-
tal for candidates from lower social strata.
The growing social inequality in educational trajectories is a major 
issue for social justice, and although its visibility is reduced, it should be 
faced along with many other problems that have been accumulated at all 
education levels and have seriously worsened during the crisis.
3.	 Recent	changes	in	greek	youth’s	political	behaviour
The basic trends in young people’s political outlook and behaviour, 
noted in every research project since the early ’90s, referred to the 
increasing distance of the younger generation from politics, their indi-
vidualistic attitudes and lifestyle politics. This trend, in harmony with 
what was happening throughout Europe, was evidenced in comparison 
with young generations of past periods, within the Greek political cul-
ture, as well as with their contemporary elders. This “demobilisation” 
took place in spite of the fact that there is an important legacy of a 
combative youth, within the Greek political culture, that goes back 
to the Resistance during the 2nd World War, the struggle against the 
authoritarian governments after the Civil War (1946-49) and against the 
1967-74 dictatorial regime. During the 1990s, important pupils’ mobi-
lizations took place, proving the fact that “feeling personally concerned” 
about specific policy measures was the main incentive for political par-
ticipation through dynamic demands for younger Greeks of that period. 
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Bigger issues and grand narratives did not seem to mobilise them any 
longer. Two research projects based on representative samples of young 
Greeks,	undertaken	by	the	National	Centre	for	Social	Research	(1988)	
and the University of Athens in 2006, showed that the 18-29-year-olds 
in Greece were turning away from the Left (37,1% in 1988 declared 
adherence to the Left, against 9,8% in 2006); were becoming more 
cynical (49% in 1988 agreed with “whoever comes to power does it only 
for self-interest” against 70,6% in 2006); and totally disinterested in 
politics (39,5% in 2006 against 15,9% in 1988) (Pantelidou Malouta 
2012). Thus, the pre-crisis climate was one of lack of or lukewarm 
political interest, cynicism and mainly right-wing world views for young 
people. The internet and its more and more widespread use reinforced 
needs of immediate self-expression and a form of individualised political 
participation.
However, the crisis – by itself, an important re-socialization	factor – 
functioned as a catalyst, changing fundamental characteristics of the 
young as political actors. Already in the 2008 “December events”, adoles-
cents and students as well as young unemployed and young immigrants 
protested spontaneously, massively and even violently, after the killing 
of a 15-year-old by a policeman. These events are often characterized 
as revolt or riot, in which social actors, whose interests are never heard 
and never represented, “demanded the right to resist” (Douzinas 2013); 
the “December events” offered a preview of the change that had already 
started within the political culture of the Greek youth, especially since 
the young people from the middle classes were involved. A fact that was 
perceived as a surprise 8. Important milestones of this change, concern-
ing thereafter the relation of the young Greeks with politics, were the 
protest events of 2011 and the participation of the young in the elections 
of 2012 and 2015.
During the massive protest events of 2011 against the austerity 
imposed as a remedy to the crisis, autonomous and spontaneous popu-
lar assemblies in squares as well as the aganahtismeni (indignados) were 
very actively protesting in Athens and other cities. The presence of the 
young people was very important and dynamic during these events. 
Indeed, it seems that when distance from politics is due to mistrust, as 
in the Greek case according to many data, and not to “political apathy”, 
there is a participatory potential ready to irrupt in dynamic ways if the 
  8 For	the	“December	events”	of	2008	in	Athens	see	also	Karamichas	2009;	Kalyvas	
2010; Vradis and Dalakoglou 2011.
Lingue Culture Mediazioni / Languages Cultures Mediation – 8 (2021) 1
https://www.ledonline.it/LCM-Journal/ - Online issn 2421-0293 - Print issn 2284-1881
Thomas Maloutas and Maro Pantelidou Malouta
164
conditions allow it. Low political trust and a tendency towards politi-
cal cynicism plus the belief in poor institutional performance support 
alternative ways of participation (Kaase 1999).
A	 research	 project	 by	 the	 National	 Centre	 for	 Social	 Research	
during the first semester of 2012 showed that 42% of the 18-24 years 
old	Athenians	participated	in	popular	assemblies	at	Syntagma	square	or	
in other squares of the wider Athens area during the protest events of 
2011, while 50% had participated in aganahtismeni protests; the aver-
age of the whole sample (all age groups) being respectively 35% and 
41%.	Still	a	very	important	percentage,	highlighting	the	way	austerity	
measures were perceived by Greek citizens. In the case of the younger 
generations, it is indeed established that in 2011 the young people, 
with large percentages of young women among them, demonstrated an 
increased wish to participate in politics and effectively increased mas-
sively their participation in a variety of ways, that usually went beyond 
mainstream politics (Kakepaki 2013). It must also be underlined that, 
while feminism in Greece is in fact still a hot issue, regardless of the lack 
of dynamic and coordinated feminist demands, the massive presence of 
young women among the protesters of the 2011 events forms a feminist 
statement by itself (Pantelidou Malouta 2015).
The demand for new ways of participation in politics by the younger 
generations is a well-known trend in European politics, in some cases 
as early as 1970 (Kaase and Newton 1998). In the Greek case, it seems 
that a distinction between the rejection of the existing political system, 
on which the young people turned their backs due to mistrust, and a 
rejection of politics in general took long to be accomplished. Even if the 
political goals, as well as the ideological identity of the young protesters 
of the 2011 events, were not always clear (and neither were the demands 
addressed to the political establishment), the spontaneous events of 
2011 helped the formation of a political “we” that later facilitated the 
electoral	 victory	of	SYRIZA.	The	 specific	 character	of	 this	 identifica-
tion was maybe not very structured, but it referred however to a “we” 
including a strong anti-austerity stance, the rejection of a bleak future 
for a young generation victim to unemployment and poverty. A young 
cohort strongly characterised by relatively high educational level and 
middle-class origin. Thus, whilst “the return of the young people” in 
politics was initially achieved on the basis of their spontaneous, dynamic 
and autonomous participation in the grass-root politics of the 2011 con-
frontational events, it was later completed through their role in electoral 
politics, by increasingly voting in favour of the Left.
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Indeed, the high levels of abstentionism among the young people, 
as well as their distance from the Left, seemed to be partially cancelled 
at the May and June 2012 elections, characterised as “a double electoral 
earthquake” (Voulgaris and Nicolacopoulos 2014) due to their impor-
tance as a disruption within the Greek political – and specifically bi-
polar party – system. An important novelty of the double elections of 
2012 (May and June) was the appearance of an age gap, with younger 
cohorts	massively	voting	in	favour	of	SYRIZA	and	older	ones	in	favour	
of Nea Dimocratia (ND), the traditional party of the Right which, in 
the post-dictatorship era in Greece, formed one of the two poles of the 
established two-party system. The latter was completely annihilated by 
the	 growth	 of	 SYRIZA.	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 that	 during	 the	
2012	elections	SYRIZA	was	the	party	that	gained	the	biggest	percent-
age among the young first-time	voters	(Stathopoulos	2014).
Speaking	of	younger	and	older	cohorts,	the	bibliography	uses	a	break	
either at 54 (i.e. dividing the 18-54-year-olds from the 55+) (Voulgaris 
and	Nicolacopoulos	2014)	or	at	45	(Stathopoulos	2014).	However,	these	
divisions do not provide a clear image of the very young people. If we 
divide the exit poll samples of the 2012 and 2015 elections in three age 
groups, we see that it is always the middle age group of 35-54-years-
olds	that	voted	more	in	favour	of	SYRIZA.	Nevertheless,	the	younger	
ones	also	voted	in	high	percentages	in	favour	of	SYRIZA,	which	was	a	
novelty that modified the consolidated image of an apolitical youth, who 
had turned Right after the 1980s. The opposite is clear as far as ND is 
concerned, with the older cohorts voting more in favour of it. However, 
according to the exit poll for the 2012 elections, the party identifica-
tion of the young people was lower than that of their elders, while their 
rejection of the Left-Right axis was greater. In fact, concerning the 
2012 “turning-point” elections, it is important to note that the young 
people proved to be back in electoral politics, with the generation of 
18-25-year-olds, or even the 18-34, showing a reluctant re-integration in 
party politics and in the game of electoral democracy, after being active 
in confrontational politics.
If we study the vote of the January 2015 elections based on a more 
detailed age divide, it is interesting to note that among the youngsters, 
it is the less young (25-34) who are more radicalized, in the sense of 
voting	for	SYRIZA.	However,	the	most	striking	data	refer	to	the	way	
that	gender	works.	In	almost	all	age	groups,	women	voted	for	SYRIZA	
more than men, with the very young women (18-24) being ahead by 
6,5	percentage	points.	This	confirms	the	hypothesis	that	SYRIZA	has	
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always been a woman-friendly party. In a nutshell, the young people 
massively	voted	for	SYRIZA	in	the	September	2015	elections	and	this	
time it was the younger cohort (18-24) that provided the biggest per-
centage	 in	 favour	 of	 SYRIZA	 (43,3%,	 with	 those	 65+	 providing	 the	
lowest, 28,6%). Young women, 18-24 years old, provided the highest 
percentage of all groups: 54,2% in the Athens metropolitan area. On 
the other hand, the predominantly young-male image of the extreme 
Right Golden Dawn party was also confirmed.
As for class politics and the young, it is difficult to formulate some 
strong conclusions based on exit polls’ data, since the absolute numbers 
per category are very small. There is, however, evidence that in 2007 the 
young people from higher social strata (identified on the basis of their 
place	of	residence)	voted	less	for	SYRIZA	than	the	average	of	their	resi-
dential areas. On the contrary, both in June 2012 and in 2015, the young 
women and men from higher status residential areas voted in favour of 
SYRIZA	clearly	more	than	their	elders.	A	political	radicalization	of	the	
young belonging to the middle and upper-middle social strata that we 
deduced on the basis of their participation in confrontational events, 
for which electoral data provided corroborating evidence. In the poorer 
areas	 of	 the	 city,	 age	 differences	 in	 the	 vote	 for	 SYRIZA	were	much	
smaller.
In conclusion, we should add that in the 2015 referendum the vote 
of the young people was extremely high in favour of “ohi” (no) to the 
austerity measures proposed, approaching 80% for the 18-24-year-olds 
and 70% for the 25-34, compared to the national average of 61,3%. 
These high percentages attest that the young people, already initiated to 
the dynamics of direct democracy at popular assemblies and meetings, 
felt concerned about the referendum and the choices of the party that 
caused it. They felt that, for the first time, accountable representatives 
were	asking	for	their	opinion.	Such	politics	seems	to	affect	a	wide	spec-
trum of the youth in Greek political culture, while alongside a demo-
cratic, participatory and egalitarian world view of the Left, aspects of 
a nationalist narrative could also be detected among the young voters 
of “ohi”. To make things even more complex, the Yes/No divide in 
the 2015 referendum was also strongly class-related: the vote for “Yes” 
reached 85% in the most exclusive suburbs of Athens, while “No” was 
close to 80% in several working-class suburbs. The class and age dimen-
sions are obviously quite independent.
In any case, the attitude of the young people during the 2015 ref-
erendum proved that in order to keep the young people – a generation 
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who recently returned to politics – within the political system, politics 
has to be overtly democratic, systematically proving this and proving 
that what the young think and feel matters. It seems that the young 
voters	at	the	2019	elections,	which	put	an	end	to	SYRIZA’s	government	
and restored the power of the Right, did not feel that these conditions 
were	fulfilled.	SYRIZA	lost	18	points	within	the	younger	cohort	vote,	
more than in any other age group, proving that if the young people had 
returned to politics via the Left, they did not necessarily belong to it. 
During the 2010s they constantly showed very low levels of party identi-
fication, anyway.
The 2010s showed that the young people matter a lot to politics in 
Greece and not only because, by definition, they represent the future. 
While younger age commonly leads to an electoral decision made closer 
to the voting booth, more than 54% of the young Greeks decided what 
to	vote	“a	few	days	before”	the	2012	May	election	(Stathopoulos	2014,	
76). And it is the undecided ones that usually decide the electoral out-
come.
4.	 Conclusion
In this paper we have briefly addressed two issues related to the living 
conditions of youth in Greece and the way these conditions have 
changed during the 2010s. The first is about the educational trajectories 
of young Greeks which are leading to less promising prospects in the 
labour market and become increasingly unequal and socially selective. 
Access to higher education has become more unequal in the early 2010s, 
especially concerning the most appreciated university departments. 
However, the crisis has not been the origin of this deepening inequality 
trend in education. Policies that paved the way in this direction were 
adopted well before the crisis and have recently been restored. The 
second issue addressed in this paper is the political response of young 
Greeks to the crisis. On the one hand, there is evidence that this age 
group has been actively mobilized against austerity measures during the 
early years of the crisis. At the same time, youngsters have increased 
their participation in the political system, both in confrontational and 
institutional politics, as witnessed by their electoral behaviour mainly 
supporting the resurgence of the Left, which plays a key role in dis-
rupting the traditional bipartisan system. Eventually, policies of the Left 
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government under austerity conditions have not continued to attract the 
young voters and the conservative party of the Right returned to power 
in 2019. While retaining their participatory/confrontational potential, 
the young seem to be reversing to a status of “standby citizens” (Amna 
and Ekman 2014).
Inequalities are increasing and social mobility prospects for the 
young people are deteriorating. Their political response, however, is an 
outcome depending on many other factors, with the politics of parties 
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